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Dora Kostakopoulou makes a spirited case for an autonomous status of European
Union citizenship – one that is not related to the possession of citizenship of a
Member State. However, while I sympathise with some of the concerns lying behind
this proposal, I regard it as a misguided way of addressing them that is based in
its turn on a misunderstanding of the nature of citizenship and of the EU and its
achievements – albeit one shared by a number of the EU’s prime actors as well as
certain of its foes.
The core of her argument is the questioning of the link with state citizenship. Her
reasoning is that this linkage is redundant given “the bond Union citizens have with
the EU is a direct one, that is, they derive rights from the Treaties directly which
are not contingent on the Member States’ approval, there is no reason to assume
that in the absence of a Member State nationality Eurozenship should automatically
vanish”. Moreover, she contends, her case is independent of discussions of the
character of the EU as supranational or intergovernmental or the broader debate
about the desirability of some kind of federal structure of the EU.
In what follows I shall question all these claims, along with the assumptions on which
they rest. In an analogous way to Hobbes’s infamous account of the natural state
in which he asks the reader “to look at men as if they had just emerged from the
earth like mushrooms and grown up without any obligation to each other”,1)Thomas
Hobbes, On the Citizen, eds R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998, p. 102. it would appear that Dora proposes an account of
the Treaty and the attendant rights it grants individuals as similarly emerging ‘like
mushrooms’ and involving no special obligations among states and their peoples.
Yet, just as commentators have questioned whether one can really ignore the role
of women and families when thinking about how ‘men’ – male or female – ‘emerge’,
and the profound consequences for any account of their rights once one factors
these vital elements in, so I doubt if one can think of Treaties or the statuses they
create without giving some thought to their creators and the relationship between
them and the resulting rights.
Once we give up on the mushroom account, then European citizenship can be seen
to arise out of what Wightman has acknowledged to be a voluntary association of
states.2)Case C-621/18, Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union. The rights deriving from this status are for the most part supplied by the
Member States themselves and reflect the new relationship they have chosen
to establish with regard to each other. In particular, they involve a norm of non-
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discrimination on the basis of nationality. However, what makes that norm applicable
is that it is reciprocal, and is grounded in mutual recognition and respect for the
distinct citizenship regimes of the Member States, including by the individuals
concerned. Meanwhile, the EU itself only exists as a creature of the contracting
states – its competences are those that have been conferred upon it by them, and
the decisions made by EU institutions in the exercise of these powers are for the
most part delivered by these same states. Much as Rousseau spoke of the Social
Contract as bringing about a ‘remarkable change’ in the individual parties to that
agreement,3)J J Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762), Book 1 Ch. VIII. so one can
regard the Treaties as involving a remarkable and welcome change in the character
of the associated states. However, that change is produced by their involvement in a
civic union that involves special obligations among them and their citizens. Outside
that Union, as the UK is painfully discovering, such obligations no longer pertain.
I suspect Dora’s account is driven in part by Brexit and the imminent removal of
European citizenship from British citizens. As a British citizen working in Italy whose
German wife works in Britain, I am all too aware of the many personal difficulties
and anxieties the fateful decision of my fellow citizens has created, even for those
of us who are comparatively very privileged. However, while I believe that the UK
and the EU should honour their existing commitments and continue respectively
to recognise the rights to residence and to work of EU citizens currently living and
working in Britain and of British citizens currently living and working in the EU, I see
no argument for British citizens to continue to possess EU citizenship once their
state has withdrawn from the EU and has ceased to sustain the rights associated
with that status as a Member State. Individual British citizens who desire to retain
this status have the possibility – indeed, in my view the obligation if they remain as
long-term residents in a EU Member State – to acquire citizenship of the appropriate
Member State, and to assume the full obligations of the association of Member
States of which they wish to be a part.
Dora talks of the desirability of ”escaping state management and the imposed link
with state nationality” and seeks to make domicile or birth “the main criterion for
the acquisition of EU citizenship”, rejecting the need for additional naturalisation
requirements as appropriate for “a political community based on law and political
principles”. Yet, such mushroom reasoning ignores the extent to which law and
principles are created and identified and subsequently sustained by the agreements
of individuals who cooperate socially and politically to uphold them as a people.
They derive from the establishment of a common political authority within which
individuals collaborate as citizens and consent to settle their disagreements
through participation in shared political practices. Citizenship of a state provides
what Hannah Arendt termed the “right to have rights”,4)H. Arendt, The Origins of
Totalitarianism, new edition, Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace, 1958, p. 296. because
outside such a political community it is impossible for any individual to claim
rights other than by exerting or threatening force against others. Security and the
avoidance of domination of the weak by the strong only come about through the
establishment of the very forms of sovereignty that Dora sees as “backwards”, and
that allow for the settled forms of democratic decision-making that give rise to the
rule of law. The EU does not possess sovereignty because it is not itself a state.
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But that is not because it has replaced states or gone beyond them – quite the
contrary. It is because the EU is the creation and creature of its Member States and
operates through their sovereign systems. On this analysis, Dora’s proposal would
be more coherent if she was advocating that the EU become a state by acquiring
sovereign powers currently held by the Member States, although this would open
up her argument to other objections of a different sort. However, that would involve
taking a stand on the supranational vs intergovernmental and the emerging federal
EU debates, which she wishes to stand aloof from. I doubt that is possible.
State-based accounts of citizenship need not ignore the important issues she raises
regarding statelessness and duties towards the citizens of other states. On the
contrary, as a matter of normative and logical consistency, what one might call ‘civic’
states have an obligation to acknowledge citizenship of a democratic state capable
of securing rights as what Jeremy Waldron has called “the right of rights”,5)Jeremy
Waldron, ‘Participation: The Right of Rights’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
New Series, Vol. 98 (1998), pp. 307-337. to which all individuals should be entitled.
Such an acknowledgment lies behind not only state duties to offer hospitality and
the prospect of citizenship to asylum seekers fleeing failing or oppressive states, but
also their duty to recognise and show equal concern and respect to the citizenship
regimes of other states. Indeed, the EU’s legitimacy and much of its success has
lain in the way it has helped stabilise the post-war citizenship regimes of formerly
authoritarian states, and fostered their mutual recognition and respect, not least
– as I noted above – through the establishment of EU citizenship and the norm
of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality. Yet, as I have remarked already,
the related and most valued rights are, for the most part, not rights that are offered
by EU institutions – the notable exception being the right to vote in European
Parliament elections – but rights that are upheld by the constituent states. However,
I agree that the migration crisis has witnessed a reprehensible failure on the part
of Member States to honour their moral obligations to secure ‘the right of rights’ for
many desperate individuals. But I see Dora’s proposal as part of the problem rather
than the solution.
The popular backlash against the EU that currently exists (not just in the UK but
across the EU) derives in large part from growing inequality and the erosion of
solidarity within states, and the association of these developments with the single
market and the failure to redistribute some of the gains of freeing up markets to
those who have come under pressure from, or been unable to take advantage of,
the opportunities and benefits they provide. The austerity measures imposed by
creditor states on debtor states within the Eurozone have served to exacerbate this
dissatisfaction. Such measures have not simply proven economically and politically
misguided, but also represent a failure to honour the founding compact of the EU
to mutually uphold and foster the citizenship regimes of Member States and their
democratic constitutional orders that render them possible. Offering citizenship of
the EU, thereby allowing individuals to benefit from the social and legal systems
of Member States without taking on the responsibilities of national citizenship, can
only serve to further erode civicity and solidarity among the citizens of Europe –
be it within their respective states, between the Member States, or towards non-
Europeans.6) Much of the argument of this short piece draws on arguments that are
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elaborated much more fully in my forthcoming book, A Republican Europe of States:
Cosmopolitanism, Intergovernmentalism and Democracy in the EUCambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, February 2019 – especially chapter 5. The diagnosis
of our current impasse is also developed in the Epilogue to Richard Bellamy and
Dario Castiglione) From Maastricht to Brexit: Democracy, Constitutionalism and
Citizenship in the EU forthcoming from ECPR Press/Rowman and Littlefield in April
2019.
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